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Prospects for International
Policy Coordination:
Some Lessons from the EMS
“Altogether, then, economic co-operation is no match for motherhood.”
Clive Crook, The Economist
lIE strong rise in the value of the dollar- in the
early 1980s and its sharp decline since February
1985 are alleged to have had wide-ranging effects
on the economies of theUnited States and its ma-
jor trading partners. In response to concerns
about the costs of adjusting to lam-ge exchange rate
movements specifically and the effects of diver-
gent economic policies generally, policymakers
have called for greater coom’dination of economic
policies among the world’s major industrial coun-
tries.’ But, despite the stated official desire for
greaten- policy coordination, little is certain about
how it might work in pr-ac-tic-c-. Some theoretical
results suggest that there are potential gains fnom
coordinated policy actions; these results, however-,
are not robust.’
One example of an explicit agreement for policy
coordination is theEunopean Monetary System
IEMS). Established in 1979, the EMS was formed to
stabilize bilateral nominal exchange rates among
member countries. Because it is difficult to iden-
ti~’the direct benefits of more stable exchange
rates per se, analysts typically have discussed the
potential benefits of such coom-dination in terms of
increased trade flows, faster real growth amid pol-
icyconvergence among member’ nations.
‘At the September 1985 Plaza Accord, for example, the G-5
countriesagreed to coordinated intervention policies that would
reducethe value of thedollar. Since that meeting, there have
been subsequenteconomic “summits” todiscuss both target
values for exchange rates (the Louvre Accord of February
1987) and indicators by which policies could be monitored (the
June 1987 Venice Summit). Both the Bank for International
Settlements (815) and the OECD have called forgreater fiscal
policycooperation, with lower budget deficits in theUnited
States and expansionary policies in Japan and Germany. See
Bankfor International Settlements (1987) and Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (1987).
‘Models using gametheory have tended toconclude that policy
cooperation will produce lower social welfare losses than non-
cooperative policies. Some empirical workhas provided evi-
dence that supports the game theory results; see Currie and
Levine, for example. It should be noted, however, that both lines
of work are based on arbitrary social welfare functions and the
existence of a benevolent policymaker. The public choice litera-
ture, in contrast, suggests that the wealth of the policymaker
dominates social objectives as a criterion for choosing particular
policy paths. If true, a quite different loss function would apply to
policy choices. More generally, the game-theoretic results
depend heavily on the loss function specified. Fischer (1987)
and Frankel and Rockett (1987) also have shown that the
results depend importantly upon the economic models used to
evaluate policy effects.20
As the one case in which some fom-m of explicit
coopem’ation has been adopted. the EMS offer-san
opportunity land data) to examine its effect on a
variety ofeconomic- indicators. This article n-c-views
the economic experience of EMS countr’ies relative
to non-EMS countries during the 1980s to see
whether exchange rate coordination has been
associated with differential gains in other’ mea-
sures of economic well-being as well as to draw
inferences about the likely effects ofpolicy coordi-
nation on agreater scale by the industrial econo-
mies.
THE EMS: AN OVERVIEW
The EMS, which was established formally on
Marc-h 13, 1979, was fir-st composed ofthe nine
European Community (EC) countries: Belgium,
Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, The Nethemlands and the United
Kingdom. Greece,which subsequently joined the
EC, became an EMS partner in 1985 but Spain and
Pontugal, which joined the EC in 1984, have not yet
become members of the EMS. Briefly, EMS mem-
bership requires each nation first to deposit 20
percent of itsgold and gross dollan assets with the
European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF). In
exchange, each nation receives an equivalent
amount of European Curmenc-y Units IECUs),
which serve primarily as aunit ofac-count for-EMS
functions (see Appendixi. This asset exchange,
however, is not so much a separate part of joining
the EMS as it is apreliminary step to pursuing the
System’s objectives.’ The second part of EMS
membership involves the agr-eement to pursue
stable nominal exchange rates, at agreed levels, for
each bilateral set ofrates. One rationale for this
policy objective is that exchange n-atevariability is
a sour-ce of uncentaintv that meduc-es tm-ade and the
traded goods sector is alarge pon-tion of each EMS
member economy.4
Although exchange rate objectives are “set,” the
EMS is not str-ic-tly a fixed-i-ate system; adjust-
memits to the exchange n-ate levels have been made
horn time to time.’ For example, in a major ex-
change i-ate i-c-alignment in Mar-c-h 1983, the
Fn-ench fr-anc, Italian lu-a and lr’ishpound were
devalued between 2.5 percent and 3.5 per-c-emit,
while the remaining currencies were revalued
between 2.5 percent (Danish krone) arid 5.5 per’-
cent (Gem-man mark). As the tMF explains:
Like pm-evious realignments, this r-ealignment had
become necessary as a m’csult of continued differ-
ences in the undem-lying stncngth of the t)~trtic-iPtit—
ing countries’ external positions, which reflected
in turn divergences in economic policies and cost—
IJrice pen-formance. These differences had gemnem--
ated expectations of exchange i-ate changes and
led to large speculative capital flows-’
Similarly, in 1985, the lu-awas devalued 6 per-cent
and other currencies n-evalued 2 percent when
ltlhe wom-sening ofthe cur-remit account mefleclecl
primarily the maintenance of a mate of growth in
domestic demand higher than that ofttaly’s part—
niems as welt as the lagged effects of asignificant
loss ofcompetitiveness vis—a’—vis other EMS coun—
tm-ic-s overthe previous two veam’s,’
Thus, when fundamental differences in economic
perfom-mance n-equire changes in the established
exchange n-ate tar-gets, the EMS has m-evalued them.
Table 1 shows the dates of these revaluations and
their effect on individual currencies.
Between revaluations, bilaten-al r-ates are allowed
to vary within margimis of2.25 percent of the de-
sired values; because Italy historically has had
higher matesof inflation than the other- EMS coun-
tr-ies, the lira has aband of 6 pen-cent. Should bilat-
eral rates violate these margins, howeven’, the cen-
tral banks in contn-ol of the two currencies are
expected to intervene in fon’eign exchange mnan-kets
in amounts necessary to bring the rates back into
the agn-eed-upon n-anges.’
The for-c-going discussion r’epresents a simple
c-haracterization of EMS policy coom-dination. The
most important exception to this cham’actemization
for this study is that, although the U.K. exchanged
‘A detailed summary of the ECU, aswell as the evolution of the
EMS, is in Ungerer, et al. (1986). Karamouzis (1987) presents a
shorter overview of the system and policy coordination.
‘Both the theoretical and empirical evidence on a link between
exchange rate variability and trade are ambiguous. DeGrauwe
(1987, 1988), for example, provides evidence suggestive of a
negative effect. Many others,surveyed in Farrell, et al. (1983),
find no significant relationship between measures of exchange
rate variability and trade. And, moving in the opposite direction,
Franke (1987) provides theoretical reasoning for a positive
relationship between exchange rate variability and trade. On
balance, however, the predominant result seems to be that
there is no important relationship between the two variables.
‘Ungerer, et al., table 10.
‘lbid, p.12.
‘Ibid, p.13.
‘See Ungerer. et al., pp. 4—8. for a discussion of how interven-
tions are conducted by the central banks of nations that partici-
pate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM).21
Table 1
EMS Realignments: Percentage Changes in Bilateral Central Rates
German Belgian Danish French Irish Italian Dutch
mark franc krone franc pound ira guilder
1979 924 2 286
1130 476
1981 323 6
105 55 3 3 55
1982 222 8.b 3
614 a25 5.75 2.75 425
1983 321 55 15 25 2.5 35 25 -35
1985 722 22 2 2 2 6 2
198647 -3 -1 1 3 -3
84 8
1987112 3 -2 2
SOURCE. Deutsche Bundesbank lntereconcm,cs tSepfember Octooer 1987)
gold and dollar meserves for- ECUs, it did not agree
to participate in the cooperative effort to stabilize
exchange rates.’ Thus, while the U.K. is an EMS
member-, its exchange rate is not specific-ally tied
to those of the other EMS nations. To make this
distinction, the EMS countr’ies that participate in
the exchange mate mechanism (ERM) often are
m-eferred to as the ERIVI countries.
The ERM Has Reduced Exchange
Rate Variability
Various studies have concluded that the ERM
has significantly reduced the variability of ex-
change rate movemetits among the member coun-
tmies. Table 2, r-eproduced from an tMF study by
Unger’er, et al. (1986) provides one indication of
how much the var-iability ofmonthly average nom-
inal exchange rates, as measured by the coefficient
ofvariation, dec-lined after the EMS was formiied; a
similar’pattern emerges if one examines data fur
real exchange r’ates (nominal exchange rates ad-
justed by CPIs) or other measures of variability,
such as standard deviations; these reductions in
bilateral exchange rate variability between ERM
pan’tic-ipants at’e statistically significant.” Finally, as
depicted in the bottom portion of table 2, the IMF
analysis indicates that exchange rates for- non-
ERM countries, such as the United Kingdom, the
United States and Japan, generally experienced
incr’eased var-iability in the post-1979 peiiod. Thus,
m-elative to the exchange rate behavior of non-EPrM
industrial countries, the ERM has significantly
reduced fluctuations in the real and nominal bilat-
eral exchange rates among its members.’
ECONOMIC POLICY
COORDINATION: A MORE GENERAL
ANALYSIS
‘I’he ERM has achieved greater exchange rate
stability. The usefulness of such policy coot-dma-
tion, however, must be judged ultimately on the
basis of n’elative economic performance. This mone
general c-miterion for judging the efficacy of such
c-oordination is important because economic- the-
ory does not suggest that stable exchange rates,
per se, guam-antee genen-ally desirable economic
outcomes.
‘Greece, Portugal and Spain also do not participate in the
exchange rate mechanism.
“Ibid, pp. 4-Sand pp. 18—21. Also see relatedevidence, pro-
vided byRogoff (1985a), who found that bilateral exchange
rates between EMS members have become morepredictable.
“See Ungerer, etal., tables 16—21. The coefficient of variation is
the standard deviation of a series divided by its mean.
“A contrary view is presented by Fels (1987). He arguesthat,
because only n-i bilateral rates in an n-exchange rate system
are freely determined, the ERM really is nothing more than a
dollar/Dmami< system that pullsotherexchange rates with it.
More important, he arguesthat the ERM appears to have
succeeded in the early 1 980s only because the dollar’s real
value had risen sharply and stimulated export sales from ERM
countriesto the United States. As a consequence, member
nations did not feel the need to pressure Germany to lead a
currency devaluation through expansionary measures. Fels
also conjectures — and is supported by recent developments
— that realignments or other pressures on the ERM will occur
as the dollar weakens.22
Exchange Rate Stability, Economic
Policies and Economic Performance
Are NOt Necessarily .Related!
The ERM does not spec-ifs’ explicitly that mem-
ber nations must coordinate policy actions. In
other words, although the ERM member-s may
agree to specific ranges on bilateral exchange
rates, maintaining those ranges may be achieved,
in principle, by awide variety of policy actions.
To illustrate this point, consider a simple model
of the nominal exchange rate;




where; e = the exchange rate ( foreign $
domestic- $
m = the nominal money supply;
= the nominal interest rate;
y =realGNP;
k = the income elasticity of real money
demand;
h = the interest response of real money
balances; and
* indicates values in aforeign country.
Allvariables in equation 1, except the interest rate,
ame expressed as natural logarithms 13 The equa-
tion implies that acountry’s currency will depreci-
ate (one unit of domestic c-unrencywill purchase
fewer- units of the foreign c-urrency) if domestic
money growth accelerates, domestic- nominal in-
ter-est rates decline ordomestic real economic-
growth slows relative to changes in the equivalent
measures in aforeign economy.
Once one recognizes, as in equation 1, that
dUference.s between domestic- and foreign eco-
nomic- values determine the level of exchange
rates, one can see clearly that astable value for the
nominal exchange rate is consistent with many
different economic and policy environments and
outcomes. For example, two countries could cx-
hibit individually real growth of plus or minus 3
per-cent; as long as the differ-ence between their
real growth tates remained unchanged, however’,
the exchange rate, c-dens pw-ibus, would be sta-
ble. Similar’ly, inflation in each country could be 20
pentent or zero; other things the same, however’,
the exchange rate would be stable so long as the
inflation differential were stable. Thus, stable
exchange rates c-an be observed under- awide
range of economic policies and conditions.
Equation I also points out that the exchange
rate c-an be affected by policy actions in either the
domestic or foreign country. If, for example, e
were the French franc-/DM exchange rate and the
DM were rising Ic, measured as French francs per
DM, would be rising), e could be decreased (the
DM made to dec-line) by increasing the Gem-man
money stock relative to the French money stock.
One way in which this might he accomplished
would involve the Bundesbank and/or the Bank of
France selling DM-denominated assets and buying
fmanc-denominated assets, thus increasing the
supply of marks amid r-educing the supply of
franc-s. These changes in the markets for the fm-anc-
and mark effectively would change the relative
franc/DM price, that is, the exchange rate.
‘3This model, taken from Dornbusch (1980). is based on the
standard monetary approach to the balance of payments.23
Notice, however, the effects of such an action.
The money supply would expand in Germany and
decline in France. First, ifthe Bundesbank were
pursuing money gn-owth within specified target
ranges, the need for intervention of the sort de-
sc-ribed could well lead to money growth above
the announced target path. Mor-eover depending
upon the magnitude and duration of intervention,
the pursuit ofa stable exchange rate land its
effects on the German money stock) could cause a
rising price level in Germany; other’ short-run ef-
fects on output, unemployment and interest rates
could be observed as well. Thus, in this one illus-
tration. the two countries could achieve one objec-
tive at the expense of failing to attain others”
ECONOMIC PERFORft’IANCE
BEFORE AND AFTER THE ERM
Whether exchange rate stability has improved
economic- performance or brought about gr’eater
policy convergence among ERM countries is an
empirical issue. In this section, this issue is as-
sessed in two complementary ways.
ERM y5, iVon-ERM Economic
Performance: Another Look at the
Eiidence
To compare economic- conditions before and
after the ERM agreement, aset ofmonthly data for
major indicator-s ofpolicy actions and economic
performance in the ERM countries and selected
large non-ERM economies was assembled. The
test consists of comparing the average growth
rates and variances of the narrow (Ml) money
stock, CPI and index ofindustrial production and
the averagelevels and variances of short-term
interest rates between two periods: February
1975—February 1979 (before ERMI, and April 1983—
December 1987 (the ‘stable” ERM period). The
interval between Marc-h 1979—March 1983, which
IMF analysis has characterized as ‘frequent peri-
ods of exchange market strain and numerous con-
sequent realignments ofcentral rates,” was not
examined.” The transition period was omitted to
focus on the comparison between the presumably
less stable pre-ERM period and the relatively sta-
ble ERM period.
Specific hypotheses to be investigated with
these comparisons include the following: Ifgi-eater
exchange i-ate stability brought about higher out-
put growth and lower inflation, a comparison of
period I versus period 3 should reveal significantly
higher output gm-owth (as measured by industn-ial
pr’oduction) and significantly lowen-inflation rates
as measured by CPIs) in the laterperiod than in
the ear-lien’ one. Ifthese conditions are pr-oduced
by the ERM, the same indicators for the non-ERM
countries should exhibit significantly differ-ent,
less beneficial output and price perfon-manc-e.
Equation 1 implies that stability in nominal
exchange rate levels may be associated with
greater’volatility in money gr-owth, interest rates or-
output, the equation’s might-hand-side arguments.”
Ifthis is the case, measures of variability for these
variables may have increased significantly in the
ERM countries since 1979. Conver’sely, equation 1
would imply no change in the variability ofthese
variables since 1979 in the non-ERM countries that
did not attempt (at least explicitly) to reduce bilat-
eral exchange rate variability.
Some caution in making these comparisons is
necessary because they rest on aceteris paribus
assumption. ‘l’hesimple tests used here do not
control for the effects of events that are unique to
some countries for example, a crop failure in
Europe) or the differential effects ac-ross countries
of a common phenomenon (for example, the en-
er&w price dec-line of the 1980s1. Thus, rather’ than
attributing a specific result — for example, a
change in average money gr’owth rates or the vari-
ance of intemest rates — to the ERM,the compari-
sons are intended solely to neveal consistent pat-
terns ofchange in the ERM and non-ERM
countries. Ifthere are consistent differences in the
economic- on- policy performance between the
ERM and non-ERM nations, it may be an imutial
indication of the possible effects of exchange rate
coordination.
D~flèrences in theAverage Values of
Selected Economic indicators
The results in table 3 examine the economic
measures that the simple theoretical model sug-
gested as important in achieving gn-eater exchange
rate stability. The table 3 entries compare the
“For moregeneral treatments of how policies and economies
are linked, see Frenkel (1986) or Kahn (1987).
“Ungerer, et al., p. 11.
“Wood (i983), examining data for all EMS countries, found
greater nominal exhange rate stability to be associated with
greatervariation in unanticipated interest rate changes in all
cases except Ireland.24







‘SOUFIC ntnahoS naMe I Sit Mone~’Fuad,
mean values for major economic- indicator-s prior’ exchange rate agr’eement, arguing that the polmc-ies
to 1979 and since 1983; entries designated with an of lowinflation countries such as Gem mamw, could
asterisk an-e values that differ-significantly between dominate those of the high inflation countries,
the two periods shown. such as Italy. I lie bottom portion of table 3, how-
ever-, indicates that inflation r-atesin the United
The data show that the inflation rate of each Kingdom amid other’ non-fiRM countr’ies — despite
ERM country has been reduced significantly since the absence of anyexplicit exchange rate agree-
1983. Some observers expected this r-esult fiomn an ment — also were significantly r-educed.” This
“Deorauwe and Verfaille, pp. 29—30, also show that the uncoor- quickly, than the coordinated ERM actions.This result iscon-
dinafed policy actions of non-ERM industrialized economies sistent with the theoretical reasoning in Rogoff (1985b).





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































variability did dec-line among EtOvl c-ountm-iesbut
increased both among the non—hEM nations and
between the ERM and non—ERM countries, it is
imiteresting to see how tn-ade flows changed after
1979 both within the ERM group and between the
ERM and nori-ERM nations.
‘l’able 5 shows that the gr-owth of intt-a-ERM
trade declined in ERM economies (except ttalvl
dur-ing the period of greater exchange n-ate stabil-
ity. tn contrast, trade by non—fiRM memnhers both
with each other and the ERM gn-oup often rose,
even though these exchange n-ates became more
variable. Canada, Japan and the United States ar-c
the notable cases of this result. Or the basis of
these r-esults, again holding other things constant,
gm-eaten- ERM exchange rate stability was not asso-
ciated with relatively larger intra—ERM trade.
SU.J.IIUARY
Proposals for policy coordiriation among the
major industrial economies have been disc-missed
nlnor-e frequently in r-ecentyear-s. Initially such
proposals were imitended to cori-ect what wer-e
per-ceived as problems created by a ‘high’ - value of
the U.S. dollar; subsequently, they were intended
to mitigate the adverse consequences ofvariable
exchange r-ates and the falling value of the dollar.
One attempt to coomilinate domestic policies in
r-ecent years in pursuit of stable bilater-al nominal
exchange rates is found in the EMS. Evidence
based on data befon-e and after the establishment
of the EMS suggests that, while hilater-al exchange
r-ates have become more stable, other measures of
economic performance and policy actions fail to
show the effects ofsuch coordination. Lowen-in-
flation tates in ERM countries have been matched
by lower inflation rates in major- non-ERM econo-
mies. Other variables, such as money gm-owth, inter--
est rates and real output mneasur-es also show no
consistent difièm-ential response in ERM and non-
ERM countries in recent years. The data do not
evenshow that intra-ERM trade has increased any
more than tradewith non-fiRM countries, despite
the reductiomis in exchange ratevariability among
fiRM nations. Overall, the only experience we have
with concerted policy coordination does not indi-
cate that general economic or policy measures have
been much affected — one way or another — by
such coordination.
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The pnivate use of ECLJs, however, is a different
matten-. Because it represents a tiasket of fiG c-un-—
rencies and because aformal agn-eemnent exists to
keep constituent cur-r-encies within specilied
bounds, investor-s have viewed financial instn,n-
ments denominated in ECUs to be less risky than
similar’ instruments denominated in aspecific
currency. For this r’eason, sight and time deposits,
loans and bonds all have been offened denomi-
nated in ECUs. Thus, the ECU may be viewed best
as a c-un-eric-vindex unit of account that van-ies less
than its constituent cun’encies.
‘l’he ELi on’iginallv had been mlended to serve
also as a means ut settlement and a reserve asset.
tti 1)0th cases, howeyen-, its use has been small. It is
n-an-ely used as a means of settlement and, as a
n-eserve asset, is largely a substitute for- the gold
and dollar’deposits a member c-oirntrv gave up to
join the EMS.
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Representative Composition of the ECU
National currency units Percentage weights
Currency September 17.1984 September 17.1984
Belgian Iranc 3.71 8 2
Danish krone 0219 27
French tranc 1.31 190
Deutsche mark 07mg 320
Irish pound 000871 12
Italian lnra 14000 10.2
Luxembourg franc 0 14 03
Nelhertanos gunlder 0.256 10 1
Pound sterling 0.0878 150
Greek drachma 115 13
1000
SOURCE Ungerer. et at (1986). table 429
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